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The Seller's Contractual Obligation
Under U.C.C. 2-313 to Tell the
Truth
(A Post Script and Concurring Comments to
Professor Heckman's Sales Warranty Article)
Morris G. Shanker*
POST SCRIPT

PROFESSOR HECKMAN DESERVES congratulations for setting the record straight on why the Sales Act's "reliance" language, as one of the necessary elements for creation of an express
sales warranty, was changed to the Commercial Code's "basis of the
bargain" language. It seems self-evident that statutory changes in
language usually are intended to bring about changes in result; and
this would seem particularly true in a statute as carefully drafted as
the Uniform Commercial Code. Yet, so many of our courts and
commentators have failed to acknowledge this essential truth; assuming, instead, that the precedents on express warranties decided
under pre-Commercial Code law should control the quite different
statutory language found in U.C.C. 2-313.
Professor Heckman's piece first shows us, step by step, the historical legislative developments which eventually led to the "basis of
the bargain" language now found in U.C.C. 2-3 13. These developments persuasively demonstrate that the Code drafters intended a
new approach to and different meaning for express warranties. Professor Heckman also shares with us some of his personal insights
regarding the dynamics which likely persuaded Professors Karl
Llewellyn and Soia Mentchikoff (the chief architects of Article 2) to
draft an entirely new approach to express sales warranty law. In
particular, he suggests that Llewellyn and Mentchikoff specifically
intended to overrule the result of Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v.
Reynolds Metals Co.,1 a case in which they acted as counsel for the
losing party. These personal insights are particularly illuminating,
* John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. 163 F.2d 643 (2nd Cir. 1948).
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HECKMAN POST SCRIPT AND COMMENT

and lend spice to his piece. Finally, Professor Heckman critiques
the current judicial authorities and commentators who argue that
the old "reliance" rule should be retained. These criticisms are incisive, to the point, and persuasive.
CONCURRING COMMENTS

I fully agree with Professor Heckman's analysis and conclusion
that sellers should be held strictly responsible for the statements
they make about the quality of their products. In fact, I think there
are reasons beyond those set out by Professor Heckman which undermine the argument that the seller should be excused from liability for his actions and statements because the buyer did not "rely"
on them. They are:
1. Such arguments permit sellers practically to avoid express
warranty liability by placing their warranty language within the
package where it likely will not be read until after the sale, if indeed,
it is read at all.
2. Such arguments restrict express warranty protection to the
most unlikely buyers; namely, those precious few and rather odd
persons who prior to a sale take the time to read all the language on
and within the packaging. The more typical buyer-those who do
not go through this unlikely exercise-are denied express warranty
protection. Yet both buyers have paid exactly the same price to
exactly the same seller in order to purchase exactly the same goods.
Logic would suggest that both buyers should end up with exactly
the same warranty protection.
CONTRACT Vs. TORT LIABILITY

The reality is that buyers pay their money for what it is that
sellers, through their acts and statements, offer to sell. And, this is
true whether or not the buyer knew of the representations or, even
knowing of them, was skeptical about their truth.
Indeed, is this not the usual contract rule? Would any lawyer
have the gall to argue that a contracting party (other than a seller)
was excused from the written (or other express) terms of a contract
because the other side had not read them until after the contract
technically was concluded? Indeed, would any lawyer representing
even a seller make such an argument with respect to a sales term
other than an express warranty; for example, the quantity or delivery term?
The change in statutory language from the Sales Act's "reli-
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ance" to the Code's "basis of the bargain" emphasizes the essential
contractual nature of sales warranty liability. Quite true, warranty
liability historically was based on tort; that is, misrepresentation or
deceit. Tort responsibility is an involuntary one for which the tort
feaser receives no compensation. Therefore, it quite properly
should not be imposed unless the wrongful action demonstrably can
be shown to have caused harm. Thus, simply making a false statement is not enough. It must also be shown that the innocent party
actually was harmed by that deceit because he relied upon it.
On the other hand, express sales warranty liability today is not
an involuntary one. It is one which the seller voluntarily assumes
and for which the seller demands and receives a price. Indeed, the
liability goes no farther than the seller is willing to assume; that is,
the express warranty liability is limited to responsibility only for
those express actions and statements which the seller wishes to
make about the quality of the goods in return for the price he demands. Having voluntarily undertaken this liability and having set
its precise limits, it surely does not lie well for the seller later to
deny it because the buyer learned of the seller's actions after parting
with his money rather than before doing so.
This critical difference between the involuntary and noncompensated nature of tort responsibility and the voluntary compensated
nature of contract responsibility fully justifies a quite different analytical approach in defining the respective responsibilities which
arise. This is a point which most courts and commentators have
overlooked. Instead, they simply have knee jerked to the conclusion that contractual sales warranties should be treated exactly like
the historical tort (deceit) action. But, as stated, once the seller bargains for a price in return for the representations he voluntarily
makes about the quality of his goods, then we are in another
ballpark; and quite correctly should be analyzing the seller's responsibility in a different way.
Surely, it is not too much to insist that a seller be held responsible for his bargain; that is, for those actions and statements for
which he has demanded and received payment, precisely as any
other contracting party is held strictly accountable for the breach of
any other contractual term to which he has voluntarily agreed and
for which he has been paid. As Professor Heckman has stated, this
requires only that one demanding payment for making a representation ought to be truthful about them.

